

WHAT ACTIONS COULD THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TAKE TO SUSTAIN PEACE IN COLOMBIA

Policy Briefing

ABCColombia

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Colombia started to implement the Peace Accord, signed by the Colombian State and the FARC-EP on 26 November 2016, at a fast pace. Arms were laid down inside a year, and there was a dramatic drop in the general homicide rate. However, threats, attacks and killings of human rights defenders (HRDs), never abated, continuing on an upward trend since 2016, with, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 378 HRDs killed.¹ Killings of former combatants has escalated, as has violence in the rural areas, with the Ministry of Defence reporting combats up by 65% compared to the year prior to the signing of the Accord and the number of victims of massacres having quadrupled.² Furthermore, the homicide rate in the Territorially Focused Development Programme (*Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial* - PDETs) areas, is double that of the rest of the country. Whilst the government has taken some measures to address this situation, they have not been adequate or sufficient to halt the escalating violence.

Whilst all armed actors perpetrate violence in Colombia, those most responsible for taking the lives of HRDs, instigating violence against communities, and hindering the implementation of the Peace Accord, are the neo-paramilitary groups. The Peace Accord established an important mechanism the National Commission for Security Guarantees (*La Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad* – CNGS), to develop a comprehensive policy for the dismantling of neo-paramilitary and other criminal groups and behaviours that threaten human rights defenders and communities. The CNGS is an inclusive mechanism with representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), former combatants, expert persons designated by the parties to the agreement and high-level government decisions makers.

This policy briefing highlights the importance of this Commission and the essential nature of its work for achieving peace in Colombia. The CNGS is tasked with the design and implementation of a public policy to facilitate, the dismantling of the groups and behaviours that threaten the work of defending human rights and peacebuilding, which implies not only the confrontation of the groups themselves, but also the investigation and prosecution of the intellectual authors and financial backers. Recognising that these groups will only be effectively dismantled if the intellectual authors are identified and prosecuted, and their sources of finance and political protection cut off.

Originally, the paramilitary groups demobilised in 2005 as part of what is known as the Justice and Peace process, but the demobilisation process only addressed the **material** and not the **intellectual authors and financiers** which is why these groups were never fully dismantled and neo-paramilitary groups quickly re-emerged. The dismantling of the structures of paramilitarism puts the focus in relation to security on PREVENTION. Whilst protection policies are essential, Colombia also needs a strategy for ending the violence against CSOs, communities and former combatants.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has a mechanism called a “Group or Panel of Experts”³ that can be used to support the maintenance of peace and security. The UNSC could use this mechanism to examine the situation in Colombia. By establishing a group of experts with technical expertise in organised crime and a mandate to analyse the situation of neo-paramilitary and other criminal organisations in Colombia and to produce a report for the Security Council, the Colombian government and the CNGS, which should also include advice on what has worked in other countries. This would make an invaluable contribution to the peace process in Colombia by addressing a key impediment to peace, that of the neo-paramilitary and criminal organisations, and enable Colombia to move forward in effectively implementing the Security Guarantees chapter of the Peace Accord. This is a key moment for the appointment of a “group of experts” as Colombia is due to hold elections next year in June 2022.

Compared to many other complex situations of conflict around the world Colombia has a real possibility of achieving peace. It has a comprehensive Peace Accord, that includes gender and ethnic provisions, and agreements for addressing the root causes of the conflict. As well as, mechanisms for civil society participation designed to deepen democracy. However, with soaring levels of violence and killings of HRDs, ex-combatants and social leaders, Colombia faces immense challenges in its transition to peace.

The UN Mission of Verification and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are contributing with technical expertise on how to improve the situation of security for HRDs, communities and former combatants in Colombia, as well as, long term monitoring and support. Both these mechanisms have highlighted the importance of the work of the CNSG. At this critical juncture in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, with security a major impediment to Colombia's transition to peace, the provision of a group of technical experts in organised crime would strengthen the work of the UN mechanisms, the CNGS and Colombian Government, enabling them to benefit from technical expertise in the area of organised crime. Particularly if this group of experts have a gender and intersectionality approach, as this is one of the key challenges related to implementation mandated by the Peace Accord.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

- to form a **"Group of Experts"** with technical expertise on organised crime, which includes experts on human rights, gender and ethnicity, to examine, together with the UN Mission of Verification and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights, the situation of neo-paramilitarism and organised crime in Colombia, and write a report for the UN Security Council and the **National Commission on Security Guarantees**.
- That the Group of Experts **consult with the National Commission of Security Guarantees and provides technical advice specifically for the National Commission of Security Guarantees** on what has worked effectively in other countries.

As 2021 is a key year for Colombia with its five-year anniversary of the signing of the Peace Accord in November 2021, **that the UN Security Council, makes another visit to Colombia to:**

- meet with **all members** of the National Commission of Security Guarantees, **to understand their various perceptions and analysis of the security situation**.
- organise sessions dedicated to listening to representatives of HRDs, the CSIVI, women peacebuilders, Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Colombians, **to find out what they need to ensure their safety**.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION IN COLOMBIA

On 27 June 2017, the UN Mission in Colombia, established under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2261 (2016), verified that over 13,000 combatants of the FARC-EP had finished laying down arms.⁴ The second Special Political Verification Mission followed the first under Resolution 2366 (2017). Its mandate was to 'verify implementation by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP of sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement. Including the political, economic and social reintegration of FARC-EP and the implementation of personal and collective security guarantees and of comprehensive programmes

on security and protection measures for communities and organisations in the territories, as well as carrying out the required regional and local verification.' Its mandate is therefore centred strongly on Security Guarantees. Under Resolution 2545 the mandate was renewed for a further year in September 2020. Added to the original mandate was an expansion of the mandate of the Verification Mission to include the monitoring of compliance with the sentences handed down by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). The UNSC Council expressed its readiness to consider adding this task to the mission's mandate, based on the conclusion of an inter-institutional consultation process coordinated by the Colombian government. On 13 January, President Duque sent a letter to the UNSC requesting that the Verification Mission verify: (1) whether those who have been sentenced had carried out their sentences, and (2) whether the national and local authorities had provided the necessary conditions for the implementation of the JEP's orders. The letter further noted that the FARC former combatants were consulted on the matter and agreed to the terms stipulated in the letter. The UK holds the Pen⁵ on the Verification Mission in Colombia at the UN Security Council.

CURRENT SECURITY CONTEXT IN COLOMBIA

Four years on from the signing of Peace Accord approximately 95% of the former 13,000⁶ FARC combatants who disarmed, continue with the peace process. This is an important achievement, along with the generalised reduction in violence and homicides produced by the peace talks and the signing of the Peace Accord.

However, targeted attacks and killings of HRDs and those promoting peace not only increased during the talks but have grown exponentially since the signing of the Peace Accord. The state's failure to occupy the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP, is resulting in increased violence, especially in the areas designated as PDETs, where the homicide rate is double that of the rest of the country.⁷ The UN has stated that endemic levels of violence are being generated in the PDET areas.⁸ The increase in violence in rural areas is a result of a struggle between illegal armed groups; neo-paramilitary groups, ELN and EPL guerrilla and FARC dissidents, to gain control of territory, local communities and illicit economies.

There has been a recent reconfiguration in the conflict which has led to further violence in rural areas particularly for those living in areas that are geographically strategic and/or rich in natural resources. Between 2018 and August 2020, FARC dissidents increased their operations from 56 municipalities, to 113; ELN from 99 to over 160, and neo-paramilitary groups to over 200 municipalities.⁹ The Ombudsman's Office denounced the presence of organised crime structures of regional, national and transnational scope, including the Mexican cartels, Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación,¹⁰ which are present in departments such as Córdoba, Chocó, Putumayo and Bajo Cauca and have a direct impact in the drug trafficking economy¹¹ and significant capacity to harm the civilian population.

According to the Ministry of Defence, compared to the last year of the peace negotiations (October 2015 to September 2016) the number of victims of massacres in Colombia quadrupled in 2020 (October 2019-Sept 2020) and combats increased in the same timeframe by 65%.¹² Homicide rates increased in the PDET areas by 36% in 2020, meanwhile outside of the PDET areas homicides rate decreased by 12%.¹³ Despite the increase in combats ELN deaths by the Security Forces decreased, deaths in the Security Forces are at their lowest point in the last twenty years, only deaths in neo-paramilitary and organised crime groups increased.¹⁴ The OHCHR reported that the number of massacres has grown constantly since 2018, with 2020 recording the highest number since 2014.¹⁵ In this situation it is the rural

civilian population that are suffering the most from violence and social control. According to Indepaz, the ideology of the illegal armed groups is weakening¹⁶ and those perpetrating the attacks against communities and HRDs are less identifiable, as a result leaders and communities have less capacity to de-escalate the violence.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been calling for the government to fully implement the PDETs and the Voluntary Substitution of Illicit Crops Programme (PNIS), together with other aspects of the Integral Rural Reform (RRI, Spanish acronym) chapter of the Accord. Slow progress in the implementation of these chapters, is exacerbating the violence.

VIOLENCE IN RURAL AREAS

The neo-paramilitary and ELN groups are engaging in torture, sexual violence, confinement (over 68,800 people were confined between January and November 2020),¹⁷ social control, curfews and forced labour. Forced displacement increased in the first eight months of 2020 by 32% compared to 2019, 67% of which occurred in the Pacific region of Colombia.¹⁸ Forced recruitment increased in the first six months of 2020 by 133%, when compared to 2019.¹⁹ The situation of children particularly deteriorated with the closure of schools in the context of the pandemic and an increase in forced recruitment of children.

These human rights abuses and violations are happening in areas where the Security Forces are present.²⁰ Our partners consider that the attacks, particularly by neo-paramilitary groups, rely on the ineffectiveness, tolerance, and/or complicity of the Security Forces.²¹ The UN has also highlighted its concerns regarding collusion between neo-paramilitary groups and State agents, one of the most serious was, when at least 26 members of criminal /neo-paramilitary groups were captured carrying weapons with special permits that only the military can grant.²² Indepaz, a Colombian think tank, reports that nationally the Security forces are not trusted.²³



A citizen of Pogue, Choco stated ‘...**the public force is not a guarantee of order or respect for citizens’ rights, just one more armed actor....In Vigía del Fuerte, there is a military base, so how do you explain why the paramilitaries and the ELN pass through here calmly and nothing happens, and nobody knows anything. This is not new; it has always been the same, there are interests in this land.... It is the curse of living in a land [rich in natural resources] ...**’²⁴

In many cases, threats to social leaders are signed by *Aguilas Negras* (Black Eagles).²⁵ However, communities report not seeing any members of this group. CSOs and analysts consider that *Aguilas Negras* are in fact the Security Forces acting under the doctrine of the “enemy within”.²⁶

In 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that illegal armed groups imposed a curfew and lockdown measures in at least 11 of Colombia’s 32 states²⁷ and as part of their social control over the local population, they threatened, killed and attacked those perceived to have failed to comply.²⁸

There is a systematic policy in departments along the Pacific Coast of Colombia by neo-paramilitary groups and others, to prevent communities from denouncing what is happening.²⁹ Community Leader, Leyner Palacios did dare to denounce the situation in Bojayá, Choco, of 100 ELN and 600 paramilitaries

confining over 7,000 people in the municipality. Subsequently he was forced to leave Bojayá in fear for his life.³⁰ Many factors influence the disputes over territory including, mining, energy development, agro-industry, road infrastructure and plans for an interoceanic canal in Choco. Undoubtedly, these issues are mixed with drug trafficking, but not exclusively.³¹

The Indigenous National Organisation of Colombia (ONIC) declared that one indigenous person is killed **every three days** in the country.³² The statement from the Awa Indigenous Tribe in Nariño illustrates what is happening to indigenous peoples in various regions of Colombia:



'...2020 became a year in which the resurgence of violence caused physical and spiritual impacts, we suffered the irreparable loss of 32 Awa lives, there were two massacres, we were victims of forced displacement, confinement, antipersonnel mines ... [we were prevented] from carrying out ... hunting, fishing and gathering. Suffered threats to [our Indigenous] authorities ... threats to leaders of the communities, attacks on families, forced disappearances, recruitment of young people, irreparable environmental effects...leaving us to disappear silently, evidencing the excessive violence we face on a daily basis.'³³

Social isolation measures imposed by the government to address the pandemic did not prevent the killings rather, according to the Colombian NGO *Somos Defensores*, they increased by 61% in the first six months of lockdown when compared to the same period in 2019.³⁴ In their report they highlight that there has been a general lack of response from the government to the *Alertas Tempranas* (Early Warning Alerts) with six of the killings of HRDs and two forced disappearances allegedly perpetrated by the Security Forces. Overall, there was a 157% increase in alleged aggressions by the Security Forces in comparison to the same period in 2019.³⁵

This situation emphasises the need for stronger state institutions in the rural areas, rather than increased militarisation. The importance of state institutions in the region, is something the UN has repeatedly highlighted, as well as, coordination between institutions to respond to the profoundly serious humanitarian situation.³⁶

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

In May of 2020, *Semana* reported that military intelligence had been gathering information on HRDs, journalists, the political opposition and others; this was called '*Operacion Baston*'. It was revealed that there was a recurring practice of selling information and weapons, as well as, alliances with some illegal armed groups to weaken others. These events implicated 16 generals and around 230 officers and sub-officers³⁷ Also in May 2020, the authorities found secret official documents in the possession of drug traffickers.³⁸ This combined with information published on the Security Doctrine by the *New York Times*³⁹ suggests that there continues to be a National Security Doctrine that focuses on "the enemy within," and furthered calls for the removal of the Police from the Ministry of Defence, and its re-creation under the Ministry of the Interior as a civilian Police Service; to open the way for a Doctrine of Security for Peace.⁴⁰

The UN reported that between 1 January and 15 December 2020, 120⁴¹ HRDs had been killed, although NGOs have recorded higher numbers.⁴² According to Somos Defensores, of the aggressions and killings of HRDs in 2019 and the first six months of 2020, where the perpetrator was identified, the group most responsible were the neo-paramilitary groups.⁴³ It is also possible that the pandemic has created a more complex situation and that neo-paramilitary activities were 'outsourced' through other criminal structures or gangs, which has made it difficult to identify who is responsible.⁴⁴

FORMER FARC COMBATANTS

The UN Mission of Verification reported that as of December 2020, 246 former combatants had been killed in Colombia; however, the majority of the killings (approx. 86.6%) remain in impunity.⁴⁵ Research undertaken by the war crimes tribunal⁴⁶ (JEP) identified that despite the government's claim that the killings of former combatants are related to coca, of the 176 municipalities with both a presence of coca and former combatants, in 111 (63%) of these, no killings were registered.

Rather the research identifies two crucial factors: the first factor was that former combatants, who were involved in leadership roles in community projects, were killed to 'dismantle ... projects linked to the implementation of the Peace Accord in the territories.'⁴⁷ In these cases, those killed were shot in public places often in daylight. This suggests that they were using these deaths also as a warning to others, to dissuade them from participating in these projects. The second factor was that they refused an approach by a FARC dissident group, because the ex-combatants refused to join the group, they were thought to be part of another dissident group or too close to the Security Forces and therefore killed.⁴⁸

The JEP research having found the government's claim that many were revenge killings or directly linked to drug trafficking to be incorrect, ordered the government to allocate sufficient resources to the National Protection Unit (UNP) for the protection of former combatants.⁴⁹ The Inspector General's Office reported that there was a shortage of personnel to carry out risk analysis and respond to over 400 requests for protection schemes in the UNP.⁵⁰ The Government responded to the JEP and the findings of the Inspector General and allocated money to the UNP in September 2020, to fill 730+ vacancies of bodyguards and risk analysts. As of 29 December 2020, the UN reported that no additional bodyguards and only 27 analysts had been appointed.⁵¹

PREVENTION POLICIES ARE ESSENTIAL AS WELL AS PROTECTION POLICIES

The Peace Accord (Chapter 3.4 Security Guarantees) established a mechanism known as the CNGS, which together with the Special Investigation Unit of the Attorney General's Office and the Elite Corps of the National Police, is tasked with the design and implementation of a public policy to facilitate, the dismantling of the structures of the "successor groups" of the paramilitaries and other criminal organisations, and their support networks. This requires, not only the confrontation of the groups themselves, but also the investigation and prosecution of the intellectual authors and financial backers. Recognising that these groups will only be effectively dismantled if **the Intellectual authors are identified and prosecuted, and their sources of finance and political protection cut off**. The UN Mission⁵² and the OHCHR⁵³ both stress the importance of the CNGS for addressing the killings of HRDs, former combatants and violence in rural areas; the main perpetrators of which are the neo-paramilitary and organised crime groups. By concentrating on the need to identify and prosecute the

financial backers and intellectual authors and not just the ‘foot soldiers,’ the focus is on dismantling the whole structure, and thereby moving towards prevention of these crimes. By removing the financiers, the structures are weakened, as these individuals are not easily replaceable, and the impact is felt throughout the neo-paramilitary organisation. NGOs have for many years insisted that by identifying and prosecuting the intellectual authors, financiers and support networks of the paramilitary groups it will be possible to dismantle the structures. Whilst protection programmes are essential, alone they are insufficient because they do not lead to prevention of the crimes.

When the Duque government entered office, it initially established a new protection programme for HRDs, the Plan of Timely Action (PAO, Spanish Acronym).⁵⁴ The PAO is built on three pillars: 1) strengthening the inter-institutional response; 2) strategic military/police intervention on the ground; and 3) a strategy for tackling stigmatisation of human rights defenders.⁵⁵ Whilst this appears to cover the area of protection, it does not address prevention. It simply adds to pre-existing protection programmes.

Although the CNGS and the PAO Inter-Institutional Commission both have the same government departments represented on them, there is no participation of CSOs or former combatants on the PAO Inter-Institutional Commission. The lack of CSO representatives on the PAO during peacebuilding does little to promote legitimacy. Inclusive mechanisms not only add to legitimacy and build confidence, but also promote a deepening of democracy. The CNGS, was established as an inclusive mechanism with representatives from the top echelons of government, CSOs, women’s organisations, FARC representatives, Colombian oversight mechanisms and the UN, this not only draws on a variety of expertise but also gives it political legitimacy. Michelle Bachelet states, ‘participation is an essential principle of governance... [it] ensures better policies and outcomes. It ... facilitates compromises and partnerships... It builds trust.’⁵⁶

At the end of 2019, CSOs representatives on the CNGS presented to the government their policy ideas for the dismantling of the neo-paramilitary structures, organised crime and their support groups. As of December 2020, the state still had not responded to the proposals put forward by the CSO representatives. Therefore they launched these ideas publicly, in a report the *Desmantelamiento del Paramilitarismo*.⁵⁷

In 2020, with the expansion of paramilitarism and violence increasing, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) ordered the CNGS to deliver the public policy mandated by the Peace Accord. The Colombian Government unilaterally and without taking into account the policy ideas and recommendations of civil society representatives on the CNGS, presented their own proposal. CSOs consider that the government’s proposal will not lead to the dismantling of the paramilitary groups, organised crime and support networks. In part because it is a compilation of policies that already exist and were produced by the National Security and Defence Committee,⁵⁸ that include the PAO. The policies are therefore based on a militaristic approach and on policies that have proved to be ineffective in the past.⁵⁹ They do not contain policies for investigation and prosecution of the authors, financiers and support networks of the neo-paramilitary groups or others associated with organised crime. Rather the government’s policy, focuses on capturing and prosecuting the material authors, leaving the underlying problem, that of dismantling the neo- paramilitary and organised crime **structures, untouched**.⁶⁰

The Peace Accord established a variety of mechanisms for security which form the Integral Security System for the Exercise of Policy (SISEP), of which the CNGS is a part. According to CSOs the SISEP is mentioned in the policy given to the JEP by the government, but with no function or role in the

proposed policy for the dismantling of paramilitarism, its successor groups and support networks. Thus, it takes away the specific weight that the CNGS was given in the Accord and turns it into a space of lesser importance in the political hierarchy, even below the PAO. This is concerning not just because of the loss of the wealth of expertise on the CNGS but also because it impacts negatively on legitimacy and on deepening democracy. Furthermore, confidence in the government is diminished because policies that have not worked in the past are being recycled.

Whilst the government has very publicly repeated that they have dismantled dangerous criminal gangs such as “los Topos”, “los Plumas”, “los Dandi”, “los Rebelión”, “los Paisanos”, “los Ronda”, “los Mercenarios” and “la Pradera”, these groups are minor local gangs, and not considered by the Prosecutor General’s Office as responsible for the murders of human rights defenders and social leaders”.⁶¹

DISMANTLING OF THE NEO-PARAMILITARY AND CRIMINAL STRUCTURES FROM AN ETHNIC AND GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Communities are marked by gender and cultural differences: in attitudes, power, access to and control over resources.⁶² Innovative responses that take into account the differential impact of neo-paramilitary and organised crime on men and women, and Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities will be essential. Policies for dismantling neo-paramilitary and organised crime structures and their support networks, will require integrated actions which include strategies that address the differentiated impacts and experiences of men and women and communities. Sustainable and effective policies will also need to include social, economic, and cultural dimensions. This is one of the reasons for the inclusion of a gender sub-commission in the CNGS and for the need to create an ethnic sub-commission.

An integrated analysis that provides an in-depth understanding not only of how to effectively dismantle the neo-paramilitary and criminal structures, but also to understand the conditions which created and nurture them will be necessary in order to develop sustainable policies and strategies.

HOW CAN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES (CNGS).

Four years after signing the Peace Accord, the CNGS, the Special Investigation Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the Elite Corps of the National Police- have not had the necessary operational support or commitment from the state to ensure their effective functioning.⁶³ As a result, although there are proposals from CSO representatives on the table, it has not been possible to establish a route or a concrete plan to dismantle neo-paramilitary and criminal structures.⁶⁴ In order for this chapter of the Peace Accord to be fully implemented it is essential that the international community examines how it can increase its support for the CNGSs, especially for CSOs and other institutions on the CNGS.

Chapter 3.4 of the Agreement on Security Guarantees is one of the areas that the Colombian government asked the United Nations Mission to monitor and verify. The UNSC has a mechanism at its disposal, that of creating “a panel or group of experts.”⁶⁵ This report recommends that a group of experts with technical expertise on organised crime be appointed to examine the situation of neo-paramilitarism

and organised crime in Colombia and provide a technical report which also includes what has worked effectively in other countries. A report of this nature would not only support the work of the CNSG but also strengthen the work of the UN Mission and OHCHR as both of these have mandates related to the Security Guarantees.

Whilst in some contexts UN Security Council “panels or groups of experts” have been linked to the Sanctions Committee, this is not always the case. A panel of experts was appointed to look at the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, initially this was not linked to sanctions. In the case of Colombia, it would be inappropriate to link it to sanctions.

Violence perpetrated by neo-paramilitaries and other criminal organisations are not only responsible for the majority of killings of HRD and former combatants, their activities in rural areas are exacerbating humanitarian crises, driving forced displacement and other human rights violations, they are also behind the expansion of illicit economies. Making them a major obstacle to the implementation of the Peace Accord.

The UN Mission of Verification and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are contributing with technical expertise on how to improve the situation of security in Colombia, as well as, providing support and monitoring. Both these mechanisms have highlighted the importance of the work of the CNSG. At this critical juncture in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, with security a major impediment to Colombia's transition to peace, the provision of a group of technical experts in organised crime, assisted by the UN Mission of Verification and the OHCHR, to provide a punctual report would greatly assist in supporting the CNSG to move forward on the design and implementation of an effective policy for dismantling the neo-paramilitary and other criminal structures and their support network. Recognising that these groups will only be effectively dismantled if the intellectual authors are identified and prosecuted, and their sources of finance and political protection cut off.

ENDNOTES

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ABOUT US

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This document was produced as part of the project 'Defending land, territory and the environment: promoting the work of human rights defenders in Latin America', co-financed by the European Union's European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of ABColumbia and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.



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5 March 2021

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