On 21 June 2026, the Colombian presidential election saw the closest contest in the country’s history, with just one percentage point separating Abelardo de la Espriella — a right-wing outsider entering the political arena for the first time — and Iván Cepeda of the left-wing Pacto Histórico.
The election of De La Espriella, adds to South America’s significant shift to the right with Argentina electing President Javier Milei in December 2023, Chile President Antonio Kast in March 2026, Peru with Keiko Fujimori winning in the second round of presidential elections announced in July 2026 and Brazil due to go to the polls in October 2026.
The geographical distribution of votes also reflects the pattern seen in the 2016 Peace Accord referendum: Cepeda performed strongly on the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, in the south of the country and in Bogotá, while De La Espriella drew his support from the central Andean region. Although Cepeda won in more departments, he received around 250,000 fewer votes overall.
From a democratic perspective, Colombians turn out to vote in record numbers – 63.4%. But the result points to a country deeply polarised between left and right, and between sharply divergent political visions. Although De la Espriella won, it was by the narrowness of margins meaning he cannot claim to have a mandate to implement his radical programme.
De La Espriella is likely to face difficulties passing reforms through Congress unless he can build a coalition. Following the March 2026 legislative elections, Congress remains deeply polarised, with the Pacto Histórico holding the largest number of seats.
First 100 Days in Office
Abelardo De La Espriella is due to take office on 7 August 2026 with an ambitious first-100-days agenda centred on rapid executive action on security, economic deregulation, and institutional restructuring.
During the campaign, De La Espriella said he would issue 90 executive orders on his first day in office, covering security, the economy, health, education, deregulation and anti-corruption. However, his narrow margin of victory leaves De La Espriella with tenuous legitimacy for any sweeping reforms especially if major changes are pursued by decree rather than through Congress.
There are also legal and institutional limits to what can be achieved through presidential decrees alone, especially in a divided country with an ongoing armed conflict and a constitutional system of checks and balances.
Economic and fiscal programme
De La Espriella’s economic agenda includes proposals to reactivate growth, reform the tax system, reduce the size of government and restructure public administration.
- Fiscal policy: His programme emphasises fiscal discipline, improved spending efficiency and increased revenue.
- Growth sectors: He identifies hydrocarbons and mining, infrastructure, agriculture and tourism as central to Colombia’s economic growth.
- Economic liberalisation: His overall approach is to reduce regulation, lower barriers to capital investment and ease the tax burden on companies, renewed oil and gas exploration, and support for fracking.
- Governance: He has pledged to cut bureaucracy, reduce the size of government
- Health system stabilisation: His plan includes a short-term health rescue package reportedly worth COP $10 trillion, aimed at stabilising hospital finances and centralising medicine purchases and distribution’
- Cut size of the State: He announced during his campaign that he would cut 700,000 public-sector jobs, about 3% of employees. .
Many of these proposals could also face legal, fiscal and institutional constraints because structural reforms may require congressional approval, court review, funding and state capacity beyond the reach of presidential decree powers.
Security and territorial control
His central security pledge is to “recover control” of Colombia through a direct military offensive against illegal armed groups, drug trafficking networks and extortion. Proposed measures include a “master security plan” using joint task forces, bombing strikes on group camps, reinforced security operations in Cauca, Chocó and Nariño, and the eradication of coca through aerial spraying.
- Military operations: Proposed measures include a master security plan, joint task forces, strikes against armed-group’s camps and strengthened military presence in Cauca, Chocó and Nariño.
- Anti-narcotics: The agenda includes the destruction of more than 330,000 hectares of coca through aerial spraying and other eradication methods.
- Law enforcement and prisons: He has proposed capturing priority criminal leaders, creating an anti-extortion search bloc, strengthening the armed forces and police, and building Bukele-style mega-prisons to isolate high-value ringleaders.
- Peace Process: he stated he would abolish all mechanisms of outgoing president Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy from the moment he takes office, reactivate every outstanding arrest warrant against illegal armed group members.
Risks to the Civilian Population
De La Espriella’s campaign used exceptionally aggressive language, including pledges to “disembowel” the left, use lethal force against protesters and kill criminals like “rats and cockroaches”, combined with his stated willingness to govern through presidential decrees rather than Congress, explicit campaigning on replacing negotiation with a military crackdown has intensified concerns about the risks his presidency could pose to Colombian democracy and peace-building.
Military crackdowns on illegal armed and criminal groups have been attempted many times before with limited success. In many regions, these groups exert extensive control over civilians through coercion, service provision, curfews, identity documents and extortion. Their criminal governance is sustained by illicit economies (extortion, drug trafficking and illegal gold mining), especially in remote areas. An all-out war against them will, given what we know from the history of the conflict in Colombia, increase human rights violations and abuses, including forced displacement and confinement, sexual violence, extortion, massacres, kidnappings, disappearances, targeted attacks on Indigenous and rural communities, and killings of Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and campesino leaders and human rights defenders.
Armed groups control many areas where the state has little or no presence, and they compete for control of communities, territory and illicit economies. Escalated conflict would leave civilians trapped between rival armed groups and state military operations. Aerial bombings, proposed by De La Espriella, are especially concerning because of their indiscriminate impact on civilian populations. They were stopped by the Petro Government because they resulted in the death of many child combatants. Most illegal groups currently active in Colombia are primarily criminal rather than political; the ELN is the only group with any political base.
Past experience also suggests that removing senior commanders rarely disrupts these groups for long, as leaders are quickly replaced and illicit operations continue. Child recruitment to replace killed fighters is reportedly at an all-time high. Although poverty fell under the Petro government from 36.6% to 28%, the absence of viable alternative livelihoods combined with an increase in poverty could still push many more civilians into illicit economies and/or social unrest.
Essential to reduce Polarisation
De La Espriella and Petro must now work to promote national unity and reduce the country’s deep polarisation. So far, however, this appears unlikely. De La Espriella has launched an “Empalme de Corruption” a dedicated legal team to investigate alleged corruption among officials from the past four years, over what he described, without providing specific evidence, as “irregularities.” Petro is challenging the election results and calling on supporters to join in protest against alleged vote corruption. Both actions risk further polarising the country even further and increase the possiblity of a political confrontation that ends in violence in the streets.
The 2016 Peace Accord is a State agreement and the implementation of this Accord is essential, it has been strongly supported by the International Community, and provides a basis for promoting peace in Colombia.