Human rights defenders in Colombia play an essential role in the pursuit of peace and the promotion and protection of human rights. But their work places them at severe risk. Threats, attacks, acts of intimidation and killings are common, making Colombia one of the most dangerous countries in the world for human rights work. This is especially so for local community leaders, Indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, campesinos and environmental defenders, who defend their territories and the local environment they depend on against powerful economic interests, especially in conflict affected areas, with a strong presence of illegal economies and weak institutions.
According to Somos Defensores, 157 human rights defenders were killed in 2024, with 727 acts of aggression recorded. So far in 2025, Indepaz has documented 73 killings. Although the figures suggest a slight decline compared to previous years, the overall situation for defenders has not improved in real terms.[i] More than 1,000 leaders have been killed since the signing of the 2016 Peace Accord.
The worst regions affected were Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Antioquia.[1] These regions share similar characteristics that reflect a contextual pattern. As illegal armed groups fight over control of territories and illicit economies, community leaders face increased risks and are in danger of forced displacement and assassination. These attacks are designed to instil fear in the communities, and exert social control.
Fluctuations in the number of recorded attacks appear directly linked to the level of territorial violence at any given time. For example, during temporary ceasefires, —such as those in Caquetá, Catatumbo, and Magdalena Medio, involving the FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central—killings of social leaders declined noticeably. Yet once these ceasefires end, the level of risks against defenders rises again. This cyclical pattern underscores the persistence of underlying structural issues that enable an unsafe and permissive environment for human rights defenders, including high levels of impunity and weak local governance.
Another common tactic used to silence human rights defenders and community leaders is the misuse of the legal justice system to criminalise them and stop them from speaking out. Criminal proceedings can start due to formal allegations from businesses, who see local community leaders as troublemakers and barriers that can hinder their business operations. Criminalisation is also used to further stigmatise leaders by suggesting their interest go against the development and progress of a region and the interest of the State, often labelling them as criminals. This also makes them vulnerable to further threats.
Such is the case of the “The 11 of Jerico” who face charges as a result of events that took place in protests held in 2022 and 2023 against the Quebradona mining project, owned by the British registered mining company AngloGold Ashanti. Community leaders are protesting against plans to extract gold, copper and silver in the region of Jericó, Antioquia department fearing that the project would cause environmental damage, particularly to vital water sources in protected zones.
On 16 June, a judge ruled against the Prosecutor’s Office which had petitioned house arrest for the 11 accused, while the trial continues. The judge declared that the 11 need not spend their preventative sentence in prison or house arrest, following alerts from civil society groups, and the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office and the UN Office in Colombia, who stressed the need to follow due process and the importance of understanding the case within the broader context of decades-long environmental degradation in the region.
Although Colombia has a solid protection framework on paper, implementation remains lacking due to insufficient political will and inadequate resources. For example, Colombia established the Dialogue Guarantees Table (Mesa Nacional de Garantías) in 2009, as a space for dialogue and coordination between civil society, public security forces and the government to address the causes and identify preventative measures to reduce the threats against defenders. However, its ability to make real and effective changes has been limited, as decisions are not binding, and it lacks a monitoring instrument. Regional mechanisms are weaker and depend largely on who is in charge, and how much political will they have to engage in these spaces.
Another significant problem is the failure to understand what protection really means at the grassroots level. For years, local communities have highlighted that the government’s traditional, individualistic, reactive and urban focused approach to protection mechanisms is inadequate, as it lacks consideration of the local realities and the different complexities between territories. For example, in regions of high temperatures, bulletproof vests are not only impractical but culturally inappropriate. Instead, leaders have stressed the need for a more comprehensive set of collective measures, grounded in territorial autonomy and local knowledge, and that pays attention to strengthen local organisation capacity as well as addressing the root causes of violence.
In a promising development, the Ministry of Interior held a seminar in June, —attended by more than 1,300 human rights and civil society representatives—to explore strategies for ensuring a safe environment for defenders. The aim, promised since 2009, was to elaborate a Public Integral Policy of Guarantees for Human Rights Defenders Work (Política Pública Integral de Garantías para la Labor de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos), which will consider territorial differences and local contexts and address root causes, and to become a policy embedded in State practices. This is a good first step, but the challenge now lies in ensuring the development of a clear roadmap and the adoption of a National Decree.
[1] Defensoria del Pueblo
[i] Between 27 December 2024 and 3 March 2025, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 40 allegations of killings of human rights defenders and leaders. A significant number of which were traditional authorities and indigenous guards in Cauca, Choco and Putumayo. INFOGRAPHIC ENG _ MAR25_final